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The Command and Control of 
Canadian and American Maritime 
Air Power in the Northwest 
Atlantic, 1941-1943
R I C H A R D  G O E T T E
Abstract : Operational, organizational, doctrinal, and cultural differences 
hampered effective command and control of Canadian and American 
maritime air power defending shipping against U-boats off the east coast 
during the Second World War.  The American desire to implement US 
unity of command over both nations’ maritime air forces clashed with 
the Canadian preference for simple cooperation.  Canadian airmen 
resisted several American attempts to impose unity of command until the 
operational situation in the Battle of the Atlantic revealed inefficiencies 
in coordination which necessitated all maritime air power in the 
Northwest Atlantic be centralized under Canadian operational control 
in the spring of 1943.
Although cAnAdA and the United States (us) collaborated as continental defence partners to defend the east coast during the 
Second World War,1 it was in a maritime air power role defending 
shipping from German U-boat attacks that the two nations’ air forces 
conducted the majority of their combined operations. In addition to 
operating from Canada’s Maritime provinces, the Royal Canadian 
1  On the continental defence roles, see Richard Goette, “The Acid Test of Sovereignty: 
Canada, the United States, and the Command and Control of Combined Forces for 
Continental Defence, 1940-1945,” in Abe Roof and Christine Leppard, eds., New 
Perspectives on Canada in the Second World War (Calgary: University of Calgary 
Papers in Military and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 6, 2012), 23-43.
© Canadian Military History 2017
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2 The Command and Control of Maritime Air Power
Air Force (rcAf) conducted maritime air power missions from 
Newfoundland air bases by agreement with the British government. 
The United States Navy (usn) and United States Army Air Forces 
(usAAf) deployed maritime air forces to Newfoundland in early 1941 
following the British-American Destroyers-for-Bases deal concluded 
the previous September. Different national approaches to the 
command and control of maritime air power2 complicated effective 
collaboration between Canadian and American air forces defending 
shipping in the Northwest Atlantic.
The Americans desired to implement their command and control 
practice of unity of command over all forces, including Canadian 
air forces, in Newfoundland. However, as Canadian official historian 
W.A.B. Douglas has noted, this type of command and control “was 
alien to Canadian doctrine and practice.”3 Instead, Canadian military 
leaders insisted that the relationship of the two nations’ air forces be 
one based on simple cooperation. What transpired was a series of 
disagreements between 1941 and 1943 as Canadian officers laboured 
to stave off American efforts to implement unity of command. This 
article shows how operational, organizational, doctrinal, and cultural 
differences in Canadian and American approaches to maritime air 
power hampered effective command and control of their forces in the 
Northwest Atlantic until all maritime forces were centralized under 
Canadian operational control in the spring of 1943.
2  Whereas naval air power constitutes aircraft flying from naval vessels, maritime air 
power consists of fixed-wing aircraft flying from land bases and flying boats flying 
from the sea. See Marc Milner, “The Battle of the Atlantic,” in Decisive Campaigns 
of the Second World War, ed. John Gooch (London: Frank Cass Publishing, 1990), 
58. Today maritime air power forces are called maritime patrol aircraft. During the 
Second World War the RCAF designation for them was bomber reconnaissance 
(BR). Both terms will be used interchangeably.
3  W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the 
Royal Canadian Air Force Volume II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and the 
Department of National Defence, 1986), 382. Unity of command places operational 
command of forces under one clearly defined commander. When established, unity 
of command vests in one commander the responsibility and authority to co-ordinate 
the operations of the participating forces of both nations by the setting up of task 
forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of 
such co-ordinating control as the commander deems necessary to ensure the success 
of the operations. Unity of command does not authorize a commander exercising it 
to control the administration and discipline of the forces of the nation of which he 
is not an officer, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary 
for effective co-ordination. This definition found in ABC-22, the joint Canada-US 
defence plan, which will be discussed later.
2
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canadian and american military forces in 
newfoundland: some context
By mutual agreement between Ottawa and London, Canada was 
responsible for the defence of Newfoundland (then still a colony of 
Britain) during the Second World War. By the summer of 1940, there 
was already a growing Canadian military presence in Newfoundland. 
The rcAf had established one flight of bomber reconnaissance 
aircraft there to patrol the British colony’s sea approaches, and in 
August the small Newfoundland Militia was placed under Canadian 
command.4 The Canadian Army posted Brigadier-General Philip 
Earnshaw to St. John’s as the commander of the Canadian Army’s 
Force “W” (two divisions) in October 1940 and tasked him to oversee 
the military buildup. In November, the Chiefs of Staff Committee 
gave Earnshaw the title “Commander Combined Newfoundland and 
Canadian Military Forces, Newfoundland.” It was not an independent 
command, but subordinate to the army’s Atlantic Command under 
Major-General W.H.P. Elkins in Halifax.5
In September 1940, the United States and Britain concluded the 
“Destroyers-for-Bases Deal” where in return for fifty old us Navy 
destroyers the Americans received lengthy leases on British bases. The 
sites in Newfoundland included in this agreement were a naval base 
at Argentia, 131 miles west of St. John’s, an air base at Stephenville 
4  Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 
22 November 1940 and Memorandum of Meeting – St. John’s, Newfoundland, 28 
November to 1 December 1940, Record Group (RG) 25, Volume 1991, File 1156-C, 
Library and Archives Canada (LAC); Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice 
and Defence to Commission of Government of Newfoundland, 19 November 1940, 
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland, 29 November 
1940, and same to same, 16 December 1940, reproduced in Paul Bridle, ed., Documents 
on Relations Between Canada and Newfoundland, Volume I: 1935-1949 [hereafter 
DRBCN] (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), 886-88. The term “Newfoundland” 
will be utilized to describe the current Canadian province of Newfoundland and 
Labrador since that was the usage at the time examined. Due to financial issues in 
the 1930s, Newfoundland had been forced to abandon responsible government and 
revert back to colonial status, so the term “colony” will also be used. Newfoundland 
became Canada’s 10th province in 1949.
5  Appendix, “Report from Service Members of Progress Made in Carrying Out 
Recommendations of the Board,” attached to Sixth Meeting of the PJBD, Boston, 
2 October 1940, PJBD Journals, Volume 1, Directorate of History and Heritage, 
Department of National Defence, Ottawa (DHH) 82/196, File 1b.; Secretary of State 
for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland, 29 November 1940, reproduced 
in Bridle, ed., DRBCN, 887.
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on the island’s west coast, and an army base named Fort Pepperrell 
on Quidi Vidi Lake, just outside of St. John’s. These American bases, 
which opened at various points throughout 1941, were considered 
United States territory and were thus to be defended by us military 
forces.6 These developments led to an awkward situation whereby 
both American and Canadian forces were stationed in Newfoundland 
to defend the colony.
The first us forces began to arrive in Newfoundland in January 
1941. us Army units came under Colonel Maurice D. Welty’s 
Newfoundland Base Command at Fort Pepperell and consisted of 
1,000 troops and a squadron of us Army Air Corps (United States 
Army Air Forces after June 1941) b-17 bombers at the Newfoundland 
Airport in Gander. Starting in July 1941, Rear-Admiral A.A.L. 
Bristol commanded the usn’s Task Force 4 and all other naval forces 
in Newfoundland from his base in Argentia on the west side of the 
Avalon Peninsula. Although Canadian service personnel accepted the 
us presence, they were cautious in their dealings with the Americans.7 
So too was Canada’s Cabinet War Committee (cwc).
Concerned about the situation in Newfoundland, the cwc sent the 
Minister of National Revenue, Colin Gibson, to St. John’s in April 
1941 as its representative. Later that month he reported on the huge 
resources of money, materiel, and personnel the United States was 
pouring into Newfoundland. Gibson also expressed his concerns that 
the us Army forces were taking unilateral actions without reference 
to higher authority and that this “raised difficulties in the matter of 
local command.” As C.P. Stacey notes in the official history, “from 
6  Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 381-83; Samuel Elliot Morrison, History 
of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume II: The Battle of 
the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947), 
68-69, 85; David MacKenzie, Inside the Atlantic Triangle: Canada and the Entrance 
of Newfoundland into Confederation, 1939-1949 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1986), 79, 81.
7  12th Meeting of the PJBD, New York, 16 December 1940, PJBD Journals, Volume 
1, DHH 82/196 File 1b; Earnshaw to Elkins, 3 February 1941, DHH 355.009 (D29); 
Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces In World 
War II, Volume I: Plans and Early Operations, January 1939-August 1942 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1948), 156; Morrison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 68-69, 
85; C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War 
Volume 1 Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1956), 179; Douglas, Creation of a 
National Air Force, 383
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this moment the Cabinet War Committee watched the situation 
closely.”8 There was good reason for such attentiveness.
Different Canadian and American perspectives on how 
Newfoundland fit into the overall defence of North America amplified 
command and control issues. The Americans saw Newfoundland as a 
separate entity outside of the continental United States and Canada; 
as the larger partner in the Canada-us alliance, they naturally 
desired that one of their commanders be allowed to exercise unity 
of command over all forces, Canadian and American, there. The 
Canadians viewed Newfoundland as an integral part of the overall 
defence of eastern Canada. Having deployed forces in the colony first, 
at the behest of both the British and Newfoundland governments, 
Canada felt its special interests in Newfoundland were paramount.9 
“There was no doubt that the [Cabinet War] Committee, and not 
least the Prime Minister,” Stacey records, “were of the opinion that 
all necessary steps should be taken to keep Newfoundland within the 
Canadian orbit.”10 Responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland 
– and how command and control should be carried out – should 
therefore be Canada’s prerogative. Stacey has addressed the 
challenges of Canadian-American liaison and command in the defence 
of Newfoundland in the official history.11 What follows augments his 
account by emphasizing the vital issue of the command and control 
of the two nations’ maritime air power.
8  C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: the War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970), 361. 
9  Stacey, Arms, Men, and Governments, 362-63; Elkins to Pope, 30 and 31 December 
1941, Massey Library, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Maj. Gen. 
W.H.P. Elkins Papers, File 19 “Semi-Official Correspondence Vol. # 3 – November 
1941 to May 1942”; AMAS to CAS, 5 March 1942, RG 24, Vol 5290, File HQS 
15-73-4 Part 1, LAC; Memorandum from Joint Planning Sub-Committee to CSC, 
8 August 1942, RG 24, Vol 5209, File HQS 15-73-4, Part 2, LAC, copy obtained 
through Department of National Defence (DND) Access To Information and Privacy 
(ATIP) Request A-2006-00357; Minutes of the 200th Meeting of the Cabinet War 
Committee, 21 October 1942, RG 2 7C, Volume 11, microfilm reel C-4874, LAC, 
copy at Information Resource Centre, Canadian Forces College (CFC IRC).
10  Stacey, Arms, Men, and Governments, 362.
11  Stacey, Arms, Men, and Governments, 360-67. It is worth quoting his conclusion 
to this section: “The Canadian forces in Newfoundland had two tasks: One was to 
defend the area against the Germans in cooperation with the Americans. The other 
was to safeguard by their mere presence the permanent interests of Canada in the 
island and to ensure that no other influence became predominant there.” Ibid., 367.
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early canada-us maritime air power relations
German battleship and battle-cruiser incursions into the waters 
off Newfoundland in search of Allied convoys during the winter 
and spring of 1941 alarmed officials in Ottawa and Washington. 
Concerns that these Axis warships might also train their heavy guns 
on targets on Newfoundland’s coast, notably the vital escort port of 
St. John’s, led to a growth of American forces in the colony. When 
Royal Navy (rn) vessels and aircraft sank the battleship Bismarck 
in May 1941, however, the German surface raider threat declined 
significantly.12 Thereafter the German Navy focused on utilizing its 
growing U-boat fleet to attack shipping in the North Atlantic. By 
the summer of 1941, these U-boats expanded their area of operations 
into the Western Atlantic, where sea and air convoy defences were 
weaker.13
12  Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 386. See also Holger H. Herwig and 
David J. Bercuson, Destruction of the Bismarck (London: Stoddart Publishing Co. 
Ltd., 2001). 
13  Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 378; W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, 
Michael Whitby, with Robert H. Caldwell, William Johnston, and William G.P. 
Rawling, No Higher Purpose: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian 
Navy in the Second World War, 1939-1943, Volume II, Part 1, (St. Catharines: 
Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2002), 183.
Douglas Digby aircraft such as this one formed the backbone of rcaf Eastern Air Command’s 
early efforts to counter U-boats in the Northwest Atlantic. [dnd photo PA 140641]
6
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In response to the growing U-boat presence off Newfoundland, 
the Royal Canadian Navy established the Newfoundland Escort 
Force (nef) at St. John’s under the command of Commodore Leonard 
W. Murray in May 1941. This organization of navy escort ships was 
responsible for protecting North Atlantic shipping from German 
U-boat attack.14 The rcAf followed suit, establishing a new maritime 
air power formation in St. John’s, No. 1 Group Headquarters, on 10 
July. Under command of former First World War fighter ace Group 
Captain (later Air Commodore) C.M. “Black Mike” McEwen, No. 1 
Group was responsible for all rcAf units in Newfoundland and, most 
importantly, to control air operations in support of the naval forces 
by flying Stranraer, Digby, Catalina, Canso and Hudson maritime 
patrol aircraft out of rcAf Stations Botwood, Gander, Goose Bay, 
and Torbay. Operational command of No. 1 Group, however, still 
remained with the primary rcAf formation on the Canadian coast, 
Eastern Air Command headed by an rcAf Air Vice-Marshal (Avn) 
in Halifax.15
Another response to the increased U-boat threat in the Western 
Atlantic was greater American involvement in the Battle of the 
Atlantic. The United States agreed to provide destroyer escorts for 
American ships in Commonwealth convoys. By July the usn assumed 
responsibility for the defence of all American and Icelandic merchant 
vessels travelling between North America and Iceland. Further British-
American discussions culminated in mid-August when President 
Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill met at 
Argentia, Newfoundland for the Atlantic Conference. At the meeting 
the two leaders agreed to implement the usn’s Hemisphere Defense 
Plan No. 4 (commonly known as wpl-51) by September. Canada was 
not consulted in this decision, and the Canadian naval leadership was 
perturbed to discover that the plan gave the Americans responsibility 
for the Western Atlantic and placed the operations of the rcn under 
American direction.16 Rear-Admiral Bristol was given “coordinating 
14  Douglas et al., No Higher Purpose, 187, 195.
15  Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 387, 652-53; C.P. Stacey, Arms, 
Men and Governments: the War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945, (Ottawa: Queen’s 
Printer, 1970), 132; Air Officer Commanding Eastern Air Command to Minister of 
National Defence For Air, National Defence Headquarters, 6 August 1941, DHH 
181.002 (D173); Minutes of a Meeting of the CSC, 25 June 1941, reproduced in 
Bridle, ed., DRBCN, 892.
16  Morrison, Battle of the Atlantic, 69; Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 
7
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supervision of the operations of Canadian escort units, which latter 
will be effected through and with” the senior rcn operational 
commanders on the coast, Commodore Murray of the nef in St. 
John’s and Commodore G.C. Jones, Commanding Officer Atlantic 
Coast in Halifax.17
wpl-51 did not, however, specifically address command and 
control authority over Eastern Air Command’s maritime patrol 
aircraft. Nonetheless, as Douglas has noted in the rcAf official 
history, “since the American doctrine of unity of command assumed 
naval control and direction of maritime air operations far from shore, 
the us Navy was inclined to exercise command over the rcAf for these 
purposes as well.” Believing that they could dictate which air forces 
could be assigned to defend Allied shipping; the usn informed the 
rcAf in September 1941 that the usn and usAAf would conduct all 
long-range cover for convoys, while Eastern Air Command, including 
No. 1 Group, would be relegated only to the coverage of Canadian 
and Newfoundland coastal waters.18 Such responsibilities, however, 
fell under the operational command that Eastern Air Command 
exercised over its squadrons. The usn thus had no authority to dictate 
rcAf operations. Canadian air force officers began building a case to 
oppose having rcAf maritime air forces come under American unity 
of command. 
In a letter to Air Force Headquarters, the rcAf’s top commander 
on the east coast, the Air Officer Commanding (Aoc) Eastern Air 
Command Air Vice-Marshal N.R. Anderson observed that the 
rcAf had more experience in maritime patrol operations, having 
conducted sorties from distances of 600 to 800 miles to sea since the 
war began. It was, Anderson concluded, not logical, nor conducive 
to the maintenance of morale in the squadrons to relegate Eastern 
387; W.A.B. Douglas, “Alliance Warfare, 1939-1945: Canada’s Maritime Forces,” 
Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire, No. 54 (1982), 166; Mike McNorgan, 
“Canada the US and Newfoundland, 1941,” draft narrative for the RCN official 
history, 30 June 1995, W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Flyn Sarty and Michael J. Whitby 
collection, DHH 2000/5, Box 17, File 267, 9; Admiralty to BAD Washington, 11 July 
1941, DHH 75/191.
17  Marc Milner, North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle for 
the Convoys (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 58-59; Commander-in-
Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet [Admiral E.J. King] to Commander Task Force 
Four, Rear Admiral A.L. Bristol, USN, 10 October 1941, RG 25, Volume 11,505, File 
1550-146/36-1, LAC.
18  Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 387-88. 
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Air Command coverage to coastal zones.19 Group Captain F.V. 
Heakes, an officer on the staff of No. 1 Group in St. John’s, agreed 
with Anderson. With a first-hand view of the military situation in 
Newfoundland, Heakes noted that the Americans in fact did not have 
sufficient maritime patrol forces in the colony to take on full-scale 
convoy coverage duties without “continued rcAf assistance.”20
19  AOC EAC to AFHQ, 21 September 1941, RG 24, Volume 5177, file S. 15-1-350, 
Part 1, LAC.
20  Group Captain (G/C) Heakes to Chief of the Air Staff and AOC EAC, 23 
September 1941, RG 24, Vol. 5177, S. 15-1-350, Part 1, LAC.
RCAF Group Captain F.V. Heakes was an astute observer of American maritime air power 
aircraft operating from Newfoundland.  As an Air Vice-Marshal he later served as the Air 
Officer Commanding No. 1 Group in St. John’s. [DND photo PA 1309]
9
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In early October, usn Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold 
Stark formally requested that the rcAf place Eastern Air Command 
under usn unity of command. He noted that the wartime Canada-
us defence plan Abc-22 allowed for unity of command if the other 
country’s chiefs of staff agreed to its implementation. Admiral Stark 
argued that unity of command was necessary to ensure “maximum 
efficiency” and the “complete coordination of the efforts of the 
Canadian Navy, the Canadian Air Force and the United States 
Navy in their common purpose of providing effective protection for 
shipping.”21 
The Air Staff in Ottawa disagreed with Stark’s reasoning. 
Regardless of the fact that Abc-22 was not even in effect because the 
us was not yet a formal combatant in the war, the rcAf officers placed 
greater emphasis on clause 9.(b) of Abc-22,22 which only provided for 
unity of command “in case of extreme emergency” and subject to 
confirmation by both nations’ chiefs of staff. As no such emergency 
existed at the time, usn unity of command was not necessary. Since 
the beginning of the war, the Air Staff explained, “co-operation had 
provided a satisfactory basis for the co-ordination and joint action 
of Canadian air forces with Canadian and British naval forces.”23 
There was therefore “no reason to give to a foreign neutral power 
more than had been given to the Canadian and British Navies.” The 
Cabinet War Committee, however, felt that refusal of the American 
admiral’s request on such grounds would be too “political”; what they 
wanted was a rcAf refusal based on “some practical operational 
distinction.”24 There was such a distinction, and it had to do with 
the command and control organization and doctrinal practices of 
American maritime air power.
Unlike the Commonwealth nations, the United States did not 
have a separate air force but instead permitted the army and navy to 
develop their own air arms. In 1935, the usn and us Army finalized 
21  Stacey, Arms, Men, and Governments, 362; USN CNO to CAS RCAF, 2 October 
1941, RG 24, Volume 5177, S. 15-1-350, Part I, LAC.
22  Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2 (Short Title ABC-22), 28 
July 1941, DHH 355.009 (D20).
23  Air Vice-Marshal G. Johnson, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, to C.G. Power, 
Minister of National Defence for Air, 9 October 1941, RG 24, Vol. 5177, S. 15-1-350, 
Part 1, LAC.
24  Minutes of the 111th Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, 9 October 1941, RG 
2 7C, Volume 5, microfilm reel C-4654, LAC, copy at CFC IRC. Emphasis added.
10
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an air agreement that granted the navy responsibility for all inshore 
and offshore patrol for the purpose of protecting shipping and 
defending the coastal frontiers. The us Army Air Corps was assigned 
responsibility for the defence of the coast itself through the tasking 
of long-range bombardment aircraft to destroy any approaching 
hostile forces. The agreement also included a provision that us Army 
aircraft could temporarily execute usn maritime patrol functions 
in support of or “in lieu” of the navy if it did not have sufficient 
aerial resources to fulfill its responsibilities.25 This was precisely the 
scenario the United States faced in the Western Atlantic during the 
Second World War. The usn did not have enough maritime patrol 
aircraft to fulfill its maritime air power responsibilities, and thus had 
to rely on the long-range aircraft resources of the usAAf’s Number I 
Bomber Command to fill the gap.26 The difficulty was that there was 
significant disagreement between the two services about the conduct 
of maritime air power.
usn doctrine emphasized the defensive focus of convoy air escort 
and patrol of fixed sectors of coastal waters (which mirrored British 
and Canadian practice). usAAf doctrine had more of an offensive 
focus. Influenced heavily by the strategic bombing theories developed 
at the us Air Corps Tactical School, usAAf doctrine emphasized the 
concept of “forward air defence,” an offensive form of defence that 
utilized aircraft to seek out and destroy attacking enemy forces.27 The 
usAAf implemented a “seek and sink” approach to anti-submarine 
operations instead of the proven defensive one that Britain’s Royal 
25  Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, FTP-155, Prepared and Revised by the 
Joint Board, 15 November 1935, RG 165, War Plans Division (WPD) file 2917-35, 
National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland (NARA); 
Kenneth Schaffel, The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of 
Continental Air Defense, 1945-1960 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 
United States Air Force, 1991), 8-9; Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, 
eds., The Army Air Forces In World War II, Volume I: Plans and Early Operations, 
January 1939-August 1942 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 62, 520; 
Max Schoenfeld, Stalking the U-boat: USAAF Offensive Antisubmarine Operations in 
World War II (Washington: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1995), 18.
26  Schaffel, Emerging Shield, 33; Craven and Cate, eds., Army Air Forces in World 
War II, I, 522-23. 
27  Craven and Cate, eds., Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 521-22; Timothy A. 
Warnock, Air Power versus U-boats: Confronting Hitler’s Submarine Menace in the 
European Theater, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1999), 2; Schaffel, 
Emerging Shield, 3-4; Phillip S. Meilinger, “The Historiography of Airpower: Theory 
and Doctrine,” Journal of Military History 64, 2 (April 2000): 476.
11
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Air Force (rAf) Coastal Command had developed and the rcAf had 
adopted. Furthermore, because the usn-us Army agreement of 1935 
stipulated that Number I Bomber Command’s support to the usn was 
only a “temporary” expedient, it gave the usAAf little incentive to 
dedicate time and resources away from its strategic bombing role and 
towards the development of formal maritime air power doctrine.28 It 
is therefore not difficult to see why the rcAf was so opposed to the 
idea of placing its maritime patrol forces in Newfoundland under an 
American commander.
Indeed, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal G.O. 
Johnson, was irked at what he saw as American hypocrisy. The usAAf 
was only required to support the usn’s maritime patrol operations, 
yet “strangely enough” the rcAf was being asked “to place part of 
its forces under the command of the United States Navy.” Assigning 
Eastern Air Command units under the operational command of 
a foreign country that was not even a belligerent would dampen 
the spirits of both Canadian airmen and the Canadian public. The 
Aoc Eastern Air Command, Johnson concluded, should instead give 
as full support as possible to, and facilitate coordination with, the 
Americans by liaison between his command and the usn admiral at 
Argentia.29
On 15 October, the rcAf’s Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal 
L.S. Breadner, informed Admiral Stark that even though the closest 
possible coordination between all forces in the Northwest Atlantic 
was desirable, the situation at the time still did not necessitate unity 
of command. Instead, Breadner advocated continuing cooperation 
between Eastern Air Command and American air forces. He 
informed Stark that Eastern Air Command was setting up a system 
of coordination in the form of liaison officers, which was also provided 
for in Abc-22.30 This was not the response Admiral Stark was hoping 
28  Craven and Cate, eds., Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 521-24. 
29  Air Vice-Marshal G.O. Johnson, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, to C.G. Power, 
Minister of National Defence for Air, 9 October 1941, RG 24, Vol. 5177, S. 15-1-350, 
Part 1, LAC.
30  RCAF CAS to USN CNO, 15 October 1941, RG, 24, Vol. 5177, S. 15-1-350, I, LAC; 
Minutes of the 112th Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, 15 October 1941, RG 
2, 7C, Volume 5, microfilm reel C-4654, LAC, copy at CFC IRC; W.A.B. Douglas, 
“Democratic Spirit and Purpose: Problems in Canadian-American Relations, 1934-
1945,” in Joel Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel (eds.), Fifty Years of Canada-United 
States Defense Cooperation: The Road From Ogdensburg (Lewiston: The Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1992), 40.
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for. However, unwilling to press the matter, he respected the rcAf’s 
decision and issued orders for the usn air forces in Newfoundland to 
cooperate with Eastern Air Command. This satisfied the cwc, which 
considered the matter closed. Upon hearing of Stark’s acceptance of 
the rcAf position, Breadner expressed the following message of relief 
to his minister: “We have held them off, so far!”31
renewed american pressure for unity of command
Following Japan’s devastating attack on Pearl Harbor and the 
United States’ formal entry into the war, American officers began 
a fresh attempt to impose unity of command over Eastern Air 
Command’s maritime air power operations. In Newfoundland, their 
main focus was to gain control over the rcAf’s No. 1 Group. The 
American officers’ primary concern was that the formation was 
not an independent command authority and that its commander, 
Air Commodore McEwen, “could not independently and without 
reference to the Eastern Air Command headquarters at Halifax take 
immediate action to support the [usn] Atlantic Fleet task force” in 
the protection of shipping.32 
They took their concern to the Canada-us Permanent Joint 
Board on Defence (pjbd). The pjbd was (and remains to this day) 
an advisory body consisting of civilian and military members 
that met secretly and made recommendations on North American 
defensive measures that required governmental approval before 
implementation.33 On 20 December 1941, the pjbd released its 
Twenty-Second Recommendation. It called for the decentralization 
of command and control authority in order to permit easier local 
cooperation and give commanders in Newfoundland greater freedom 
31  USN CNO to RCAF CAS, 27 October 1941, RG 24, Vol. 5177, S. 15-1-350, I, 
LAC; Minutes of the 115th Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, 6 November 
1941, RG 2, 7C, Volume 6, microfilm # C-4654, LAC, copy at CFC IRC; minute 
by CAS to Power on Admiral Stark’s letter, 3 November 1941, RG 24, Vol. 5177, S. 
15-1-350, I, LAC. Quote from latter.
32  Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 389; Stanley W. Dziuban, United 
States Army in World War II Special Studies: Military Relations Between the United 
States and Canada, 1939-1945 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Department of the Army, 1959), 124, 118. Quote from latter.
33  George F.G. Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary 
People, third edition (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1974), 408.
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of action to deal immediately with the operational situation. President 
Roosevelt approved the recommendation on 24 December 1941, 
followed by the cwc on 14 January 1942.34 However, as American 
official historian Stanley W. Dziuban has noted, the wording of the 
recommendation was not very precise, as it “gave broad scope to the 
measures that might be taken.”35
The rcAf was also uncomfortable with the pjbd’s Twenty-Second 
Recommendation. Because it would decrease the Aoc Eastern Air 
Command’s authority over rcAf forces in Newfoundland, the Air 
Staff suspected that the Americans would try to secure us unity of 
command over No. 1 Group. Indeed, Canadian airmen were even 
more suspicious of American intentions now that the United States 
was formally at war. They feared that any kind unity of command 
under an American officer in Newfoundland would lead to the splitting 
of the rcAf in the colony into two parts, one under the operational 
command of the usn and one under the usAAf.36
A division of Eastern Air Command squadrons on us service lines 
would be disastrous for the rcAf. In addition to the organizational 
and doctrinal issues mentioned above, it also contravened the concept 
of the indivisibility of air power.37 Division of Eastern Air Command 
under the Americans would also mean a complete loss of the rcAf’s 
responsibility for both the defence of shipping off Newfoundland’s 
coast and the air defence of the colony even though Canada had more 
military aircraft in Newfoundland than the Americans. In addition, 
these factors threatened to have a negative effect on the rcAf’s morale 
34  Stacey, Arms, Men, and Governments, 363-64; Pope to Ralston, 2 January 1942, 
DHH 112.11 (D1A) Volume 3; Twenty-Second Recommendation of the Permanent 
Joint Board on Defence, 20 December 1941, DHH 79/35; Minutes of the 136th 
Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, 14 January 1942, RG 2, 7C, Volume 8, 
microfilm # C-4874, LAC, copy at CFC IRC
35  Dziuban, Military Relations, 124, 117; PJBD Journal of Discussions and Decisions, 
20 December 1941, reproduced in Paul Bridle, ed., DRBCN, 910. Quote from former.
36  AOC EAC to AFHQ, 21 December 1941, DHH 79/237.
37  The concept of the indivisibility of air power dictates that all military air assets 
of a nation—including maritime air power—should be under a separate service, 
the air force, to ensure the proper concentration and specialized use of air power 
in the hands of those best trained for it, air force officers. James A. Winnefeld 
and Dana J. Johnson, Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and 
Control, 1942-1991 (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 7; David 
MacIsaac, “Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” in Peter Paret, 
ed., Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), 631.
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and also the efficiency of its maritime patrol operations.38 This latter 
concern was one that Rear-Admiral Murray, the rcn commander in 
Newfoundland, shared. He feared that splitting the rcAf on us service 
lines threatened to “involve a loss of rcAf effort over the sea, thereby 
weakening the support now given to the rcn in its responsibility for 
the protection of trade in coastal waters.”39
Group Captain Heakes echoed Murray’s sentiments and made 
another important observation. The strength of the American 
argument declined exponentially with the decreasing number of 
United States forces in Newfoundland: American commanders would 
no longer be able to argue that the country with the largest forces 
should exercise unity of command. He accurately predicted that the 
Americans would soon transfer many of their forces currently in 
Newfoundland to the Pacific to face the Japanese threat. The rcAf’s 
stance in favour of cooperation versus American unity of command 
would thus be strengthened.40 Air Vice-Marshal Anderson agreed with 
these conclusions, adding, “Canadian commanders cannot relinquish 
their command or responsibility to their government.” Cooperation, 
Anderson concluded, would have to suffice to coordinate Canadian 
and American maritime air power operations.41 
Anderson also understood that the responsibilities of both Air 
Commodore McEwen’s headquarters in St. John’s and his own in 
Halifax were growing every week. To ensure greater efficiency and to 
placate American concerns about McEwen’s lack of local authority 
over air operations, Anderson agreed to decentralize command and 
control of No. 1 Group aircraft in Newfoundland in fulfillment of the 
pjbd’s Twenty-Second Recommendation. However, because the rcAf 
still viewed Newfoundland as an integral part of the overall defence 
of the Canadian Atlantic coast, Anderson decided it was imperative 
that he retain operational command over all rcAf forces in eastern 
38  AOC EAC to AFHQ, 21 December 1941, DHH 79/237.
39  Murray to Secretary of the Naval Board, 16 May 1942, DHH 355.009 (D20). 
40  Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 389-90; Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, 
Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: Macmillan, Inc., 
1990), 74. The USAAF’s Forty-Ninth Bombardment Squadron is a good example. 
It was scheduled to arrive in Newfoundland in early December 1941 but had been 
delayed at Mitchell Field in New York due to poor weather. After Pearl Harbor, 
instead of proceeding to Gander, the squadron was re-diverted to Hawaii. See Air 
Commodore Cuffe for CAS to AOC EAC, 23 December 1941, RG 24, Volume 5174, 
File HQS 15-1-204, LAC.
41  AOC EAC to AFHQ, 22 December 1941, DHH 79/237.
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Canada so that “the whole of the command’s resources [were]... 
immediately available to reinforce stations in any part of the region 
where the enemy struck.” Anderson therefore only granted McEwen 
“local operational control” over No. 1 Group forces in Newfoundland.42 
The Americans reacted favourably to this measure, which came 
into effect on 20 January 1942. Thereafter, the Aoc Eastern Air 
Command in Halifax gave only “general directives” to the Aoc No. 
1 Group in St. John’s. This arrangement ensured that McEwen’s 
maritime patrol aircraft would be available, through cooperation, to 
support usn forces based in Newfoundland.43
In the us Army official history, Stanley Dziuban has written that 
with the implementation of the pjbd’s Twenty-Second Recommendation 
for No. 1 Group in Newfoundland, “the u.s. Navy task force commander 
at Argentia finally achieved the unified operational control of all the 
air and naval resources of the two countries available for his task” of 
protecting maritime trade.44 This is an incorrect assessment. Actual 
operational control of rcAf aircraft in Newfoundland remained 
with the Air Officer Commanding No. 1 Group in St., John’s, Air 
Commodore McEwen, not with the usn’s Rear-Admiral Bristol. The 
command and control arrangement between Canadian and American 
maritime air power forces thus continued to be one based on the 
principle of mutual cooperation, as provided for in Abc-22. 
The arrangement was realized in the form of a system of air 
coverage for convoys whereby “cooperation of the rcAf with the 
us Navy [was] accomplished by means of proposals mutually 
acceptable.”45 In Argentia, Rear-Admiral Bristol sent “proposals” for 
air coverage to McEwen in St. John’s, who then had the right to 
decide whether or not he would employ his resources to meet the 
usn request. To ensure that proper air coverage was provided to 
shipping, the Americans and No. 1 Group also developed a system 
of mutual assistance: if one maritime patrol force (i.e., usn air forces 
42  AOC EAC to AFHQ, 22 December 1941, DHH 79/237; Douglas, Creation of a 
National Air Force, 389. Quote from latter. See also Memorandum from Vice-Chief 
of the General Staff, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff and Director of Plans to Chiefs 
of Staff Committee, 21 December 1941, DHH 355.009 (D20).
43  Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 363-64; Douglas, Creation of a National 
Air Force, 390.
44  Dziuban, Military Relations, 124.
45  “Air Coverage,” Notes on Convoy Organization Western North Atlantic, 20 March 
1942, DHH 181.002 (D156).
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at Argentia) was unable for any reason (i.e., weather conditions) to 
provide aircraft to protect shipping in any given area, it could request 
that another force (i.e., No. 1 Group rcAf or the usAAf at Stephenville 
or Gander) provide aircraft to perform the task in its stead.46 This 
system worked well for most of 1942, as there were no instances of 
the Aoc No. 1 Group refusing any of the us admiral’s requests for air 
coverage. Developments in the war against the U-boats later in the 
year, however, put increased pressure on Canadian and American 
maritime air power formations and forced a re-assessment of their 
command and control arrangements.
the intensification of u-boat operations and the 
failure of cooperation
Starting in March 1942, Canada and the United States faced a 
growing U-boat campaign against shipping in the Western Atlantic. 
Before Pearl Harbor, so as not to infringe on American neutrality 
and bring the United States into the war, Adolf Hitler had placed 
strict restrictions on U-boat operations in North American waters 
south of Newfoundland.47 However, after Germany’s declaration of 
war on the us, Hitler gave his U-boat commanders a free hand to 
attack all shipping in the Western Atlantic just at a time when the 
United States was moving the bulk of its maritime forces to the 
Pacific to make up for losses to the Japanese. After U-boats ravished 
unescorted shipping off the American coast in the first few months 
of 1942, the United States finally agreed to implement the proven 
convoy system in its waters.48 Nonetheless, the rcAf pointed to the 
poor us anti-submarine performance off its coast against a relatively 
small number of German U-boats as further evidence of why Eastern 
46  See correspondence between the Canadian and American air forces in Newfoundland 
from 20 December 1941 to March 1942, DHH 181.002 (D173). Also see Douglas et 
al., No Higher Purpose, 595.
47  Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 391; F.H. Hinsley, Hitler’s Strategy 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1951), 59; Anthony Martienssen, Hitler and 
His Admirals (London: Secker and Warburg, 1948), 117-118.
48  Elliot Cohen and John Gooch Describe this as a major American “failure to learn” 
from their British allies. Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes, Chapter 4.
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Air Command aircraft should not come under American unity of 
command.49
By April 1942, with fewer easy pickings off the us east coast, 
German Admiral Karl Dönitz once again unleashed his U-boat wolf 
packs on convoys transiting the main North Atlantic shipping lanes. 
This development put greater pressure on Canadian and American 
maritime patrol forces in Eastern Canada and Newfoundland. By the 
middle of the year, it was becoming clear that Canadian-American 
efforts to coordinate their maritime air power based on mutual 
cooperation were insufficient, as naval escorts complained of poor 
communication and scanty air coverage.50 To help solve this problem, 
the British sent experts from rAf Coastal Command to North 
America to assess the situation there and make recommendations for 
improvement.51
Coastal Command had been conducting maritime patrol operations 
in the North Atlantic since the beginning of the war. Its personnel 
worked closely with the Royal Navy in joint headquarters utilizing 
the British operational control system of command and control.52 This 
proved to be a very efficient means of coordinating maritime trade 
defence operations; and combined with the development of the best 
anti-submarine weapons and doctrine, Coastal Command became 
the premier maritime air power organization in the world. The 
British airmen who visited North America were therefore well placed 
49  See, for example, the following document written by Heakes: Memorandum 
“Unity of Command, Newfoundland” by Joint Planning Sub-Committee for Chiefs 
of Staff Committee, 8 August 1942, RG 24, Volume 5209, File HQS 15-73-4, Part 2, 
LAC. Heakes was an Air Commodore by this time and would become the AOC No. 
1 Group commander in December 1942 after being promoted to Air Vice-Marshal.
50  See, for example, “Review of Conditions by Local Escorts (March to September, 
1942) and Suggestions for Increasing the Effectiveness,” Memorandum by Commander 
J.M. Rowland, RN, captain of His Majesty’s Ship (HMS) Walker, 21 September 
1942, DHH 181.002 (D121).
51  Captain D.V. Peyton-Ward, The RAF in the Maritime War, Volume III: The 
Atlantic and Home Waters – The Preparative Phase, July 1941 to February 1943, 
RAF Air Historical Branch Narrative, 1947, 62-63, The UK National Archives 
(TNA), Public Records Office (PRO) Air Ministry (Air) File 41/47 [copy available 
at DHH, File 79/599]; Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 523; Douglas et 
al., No Higher Purpose, 595.
52  On the development of this system see Richard Goette, “The British Joint Area 
Combined Headquarters Scheme and the Command and Control of Maritime Air 
Power,” Royal Air Force Air Power Review 14, 3 (Autumn/Winter 2011): 119-35.
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to comment on Canadian and American maritime patrol efforts to 
protect Allied shipping in the Western Atlantic.53
One of the British officers’ main criticisms was the command 
and control organization in the Western Atlantic. In particular, the 
Coastal Command experts decried the existence of several Canadian 
and American command organizations in the area—what historian 
Sean Maloney has called “fragmented national commands”—and 
their reliance on cooperation to coordinate air forces for multiple 
tasks (i.e., the defence of shipping and continental defence against 
enemy attack). The British officers insisted on command and control 
centralization: Canada and the United States should implement 
the British operational control system and place all of their anti-
submarine forces, naval and air, under one single authority.54
The disadvantages of cooperation were especially beginning 
to show in Newfoundland. By autumn 1942, the rcAf had begun 
adhering to the rAf Coastal Command practice of only providing 
air coverage to convoys that intelligence indicated were actually 
threatened by U-boat attack. As a result, No. 1 Group frequently did 
not provide all of the air patrols that the usn admiral at Argentia 
(by now Rear-Admiral Brainard) proposed because intelligence 
from Ottawa revealed that there were no U-boats in the area.55 
The Americans did not adhere to the British practice, and this led 
to a number of instances where the usAAf commanding officer in 
Newfoundland, Major-General Gerald C. Brant, neglected to fulfill 
rcAf requests for assistance in prosecuting U-boat contacts based on 
fresh intelligence. One incident in late November was demonstrative 
of how cooperation was proving inefficient. 
When fog at Argentia prevented usn aircraft from providing 
coverage to a nearby convoy, Air Commodore McEwen at No. 1 Group 
53  The best source on Coastal Command’s maritime trade defence efforts during 
the Second World War is John Buckley, The RAF and Trade Defence, 1919-1945: 
Constant Endeavour (Keele, U.K.: Ryburn Publishing, Keele University Press, 1995). 
54  Report on Visit of EAC Halifax and RCAF Station, Dartmouth, N.S., by Wing 
Commander S.R. Gibbs, RAF Coastal Command, [n.d. July 1942] and Report by 
Commander P.B. Martineau, R.N. (from staff of RAF Coastal Command) on Visit 
to Eastern Air Command and Western Air Command , 31 October and 8 November 
1942, Air 15/217, TNA, PRO; Sean M. Maloney, Securing Command of the Sea: 
NATO Naval Planning, 1948-1954 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 
44.  Quote from latter.
55  Martineau, Memorandum to Staff, 31 October 1942, Air 15/217, PRO, TNA; 
Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 530.
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in St. John’s attempted to compensate by providing rcAf Bomber 
Reconnaissance aircraft from Sydney. However, when he requested 
further assistance from usAAf b-17 aircraft at Gander, Major-General 
Brant’s headquarters failed to respond. The resulting absence of air 
protection allowed a German U-boat to sink one ship and damage 
two others. Incidents such as this greatly frustrated the rcAf. Its 
commanders on the east coast were fed up with both Major-General 
Brant’s lack of cooperation and Rear-Admiral Brainard’s constant 
“proposals” for air cover of convoys which intelligence indicated 
were not threatened. The Air Staff decided to join the rcn in its 
campaign during the winter of 1942-1943 to have all air and sea 
anti-submarine forces in the Northwest Atlantic brought under one 
Canadian authority.56
centralizing maritime air power under canadian 
operational control
The command and control arrangements for naval and air defence 
of shipping that Canada and the United States agreed to in 1941 
were based on a majority of American air and naval forces being 
located in the Western Atlantic. The Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor changed this premise when the us was forced to re-deploy a 
large number of its forces to the Pacific to make up for losses. This 
left Canadian maritime trade defence forces greatly outnumbering 
American ones in the Northwest Atlantic. Regarding naval forces, 
Canada contributed 48 per cent of the convoy escorts in the North 
Atlantic, while the us contributed only 2 per cent.57 In terms of 
maritime air power, by late November 1942 Eastern Air Command 
had ten bomber reconnaissance squadrons, four of which were in 
Newfoundland under No. 1 Group. The United States had only 
56  Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 531. See also Chapters 2 and 3 of 
W.G.D. Lund, “Command Relationships in the North West Atlantic, 1939-1943,” 
MA Thesis, History, Queen’s University, 1972; and Chapter 11 of Douglas, et al., No 
Higher Purpose.
57  That 2 per cent consisted of USN ships and US Coast Guard cutters. Britain’s 
Royal Navy provided the other 50 per cent of the escorts, though they were largely 
concentrated in the mid- and eastern Atlantic, not the Northwest Atlantic where 
the Canadians predominated. Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 546; Lund, 
“Command Relations,” 42-43 and 46-48.
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two usn flying-boat squadrons operating out of Argentia, plus two 
usAAf long-range b-17 squadrons operating out of Gander and 
Stephenville.58
With the larger number of forces, Canada should have had 
greater command and control influence over maritime air power 
in the Northwest Atlantic. However, there was a holdover effect 
after Pearl Harbor in that the us was able to maintain its more 
favourable command and control position for several months despite 
the redeployment of most of its forces to the Pacific. This situation 
was not lost on Canada’s naval and air force leaders; and it only 
added impetus to their push to centralize maritime forces under one 
Canadian authority. A Canadian commander-in-chief made sense 
for Eastern Air Command both in terms of operational efficiency, 
as the failure of cooperation had demonstrated, and because it had 
the majority of maritime air forces in the area. Furthermore, by 
late 1942 the rcAf was providing all of the convoy coverage to the 
north and east of Newfoundland, which is where the bulk of U-boat 
operations against Allied shipping were taking place.59 Indeed, the 
U-boats’ success against the convoys plying the North Atlantic run 
was causing much consternation to Allied planners.
By autumn 1942 shipping losses reached levels that threatened 
Operation “Bolero,” the build-up in Britain of Western Allied forces 
for a re-entry onto continental Europe. Alarmed, Allied leaders put 
the defeat of the U-boat on the top of their list of priorities when 
they met in North Africa at Casablanca in January 1943.60 Military 
planners from Britain and the United States concluded that the 
current anti-submarine effort lost “much in efficiency and economy 
of force through the lack of a central coordinating authority.”61 
Discussions continued in the weeks that followed on how to reorganize 
the command and control structure in the Western Atlantic. They 
soon began to bear fruit.
Canadian planners commenced consultations with their American 
service counterparts in the early winter of 1943. To the Canadians’ 
pleasant surprise, the usn and the usAAf revealed that they were willing 
58  Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, Appendix E.
59  Douglas, “Alliance Warfare,” 168; Douglas et al., No Higher Purpose, 595.
60  Miner, “The Battle of the Atlantic,” 56.
61  Air Force Combined Staff (AFCS) Washington to RCAF HQ Ottawa, 2 February 
1943, RG 24, Vol. 5270, S. 28-1-2, LAC.
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to surrender operational control over all of their anti-submarine forces 
in the Northwest Atlantic to Canada provided that one commander, 
i.e., a Canadian commander-in-chief (CinC), was made responsible 
for the trade defence effort in the area. This proposed arrangement 
definitely appealed to the rcAf leadership, as it would potentially 
allow the Aoc Eastern Air Command to gain operational control of 
American maritime patrol aircraft in Newfoundland.62 What had led 
to this American change of heart? 
Great changes were afoot in the usAAf regarding its effort against 
the U-boats, and the rcAf learned how effective the rAf Coastal 
Command officers’ visit to North America had been. Analysis and 
constructive criticism from the British airmen had led the usAAf 
to re-evaluate its anti-submarine operations and its command and 
control organization.63 The first step occurred on 15 October 1942, 
when the usAAf transformed Number I Bomber Command into 
the Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command by eliminating its 
continental defence bombardment role and tasking it solely with anti-
submarine operations.64 In mid-February 1943, the usAAf squadrons 
in Newfoundland passed to the Twenty-Fifth Wing of the usAAf 
Anti-Submarine Command and immediately began exploring better 
ways to counter the U-boat menace.65 
Also in February, the usAAf agreed that its forces in Newfoundland 
would abandon their primary “seek and sink” doctrine. They would 
now adhere to the rcAf practice of placing the protection of shipping 
as the first priority and the destruction of U-boats as a secondary 
62  AFHQ to AOC EAC, 3 February 1943 and CNS to Commanding Officer 
Atlantic Coast (COAC), 4 February 1943, RG 24, Vol. 5270, S.28-1-2, LAC; DCAS 
Memorandum to Power, 4 February 1943, DHH 77/528; RCAF HQ Ottawa to Air 
Force, Combined Staff, Washington, 5 February 1943, DHH 77/528.
63  See, for example, Group Captain P.F. Canning, RAF, to Chief of Staff to The 
Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, Liaison Officer Eastern Theatre of Operations 
and 1st Air Force, and Executive Officer, I Bomber Command, 17 February 1942, 
Air 15/217, PRO, TNA; Craven and Cate, eds., Army Air Forces in World War II, 
I, 541.
64  Canning to Chief of Staff to The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, Liaison 
Officer, Eastern Theatre of Operations and 1st Air Force, and Executive Officer, I 
Bomber Command, 17 February 1942, Air 15/217, TNA, PRO; Craven and Cate, 
eds., Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 537-53. 
65  Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds. The Army Air Forces In World 
War II, Volume II: Europe: Torch to Pointblank, August 1942-December 1943 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 393; Douglas, Creation of a National 
Air Force, 546.
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aim.66 It was a remarkable concession, not only because it ensured 
common and united priorities in convoy defence efforts in the region, 
but also because it demonstrated good faith on the part of the 
Americans to carry out their responsibilities successfully. The most 
important effect of the Coastal Command officers, however, was 
that the usn and usAAf became amenable to the idea of centralizing 
command and control in the Northwest Atlantic under Canadian 
authority.67 Discussions continued in Washington during the winter 
of 1943, culminating in the Atlantic Convoy Conference in March.
The major triumph for Canada at this meeting of Canadian, 
American and British experts on the anti-U-boat campaign was 
agreement on the creation of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic 
Command theatre of operations. Established on 30 April 1943, the 
new command organization was based on the British system of 
operational control. Canada was granted operational control over all 
air and surface escorts in the area west of 47°W and north of 40°N, 
including Newfoundland. Rear-Admiral Murray became the theatre 
CinC, exercising operational control over all naval forces. He also 
was also given operational direction over all maritime patrol aircraft, 
which he exercised through his deputy, the commander of Eastern 
Air Command, Air Vice-Marshal G.O. Johnson, who oversaw the 
detailed maritime patrol operations.68
Johnson’s official title was re-designated Air Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Air Command. He now exercised 
“general operational control” over all Allied air forces employed in the 
66  Report of Convoy Conference, Argentia, 26-27 February 1943, DHH 181.002 
(D96); Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 545-46. 
67  Canning to Chief of Staff to The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, Liaison 
Officer, Eastern Theatre of Operations and 1st Air Force, and Executive Officer, I 
Bomber Command, 17 February 1942, Air 15/217, TNA, PRO; Craven and Cate, 
eds., Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 541; Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces In 
World War II, II, 393; Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 546.
68  “Report of Sub-Committee on Command Relations,” 9 March 1943, Atlantic 
Convoy Conference Minutes, 181.003 (D5027); Minutes of the 224th Meeting of 
the Cabinet War Committee, 11 March 1943, RG 2 7C, Volume 12, microfilm reel 
C-4875, LAC, copy at CFC IRC; Lund, “Command Relationships,” 51; Douglas et 
al., No Higher Purpose, 624-630; W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, Michael Whitby, 
with Robert H. Caldwell, William Johnston, and William G.P. Rawling, Blue Water 
Navy: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second 
World War, 1939-1943, Volume II, Part 2 (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing 
Limited, 2007), 23-24; Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 367. Johnson had 
become AOC Eastern Air Command in January 1943.
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defence of shipping in the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command. 
In Newfoundland, Johnson delegated the “local operational control” 
of all maritime patrol operations to the Aoc No. 1 Group, Air Vice-
Marshal (formerly Group Captain) Heakes.69 “General” operational 
control meant that the AocinC Eastern Air Command continued 
to pass “general directives” to the Aoc No. 1 Group, although now 
they included directives for the use of usn and usAAf aircraft in the 
defence of convoys. “Local” operational control meant that Heakes 
retained operational control over rcAf forces in Newfoundland and 
now also had operational control over all American maritime patrol 
forces.
In order to carry out this new arrangement in Newfoundland, 
a team from the usAAf’s new Twenty-Fifth Anti-Submarine Wing 
joined Heakes’ staff at No. 1 Group Headquarters in St. John’s 
on 30 March 1943. Although the usAAf group technically did not 
have to make this move until the Canadian Northwest Atlantic 
Command formally came into existence on 30 April, they did so in 
69  Report of Sub-Committee on Command Relations, 9 March 1943, Atlantic Convoy 
Conference Minutes, DHH 181.003 (D5027). 
As Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Air Command, rcaf Air Vice-Marshal G.O. 
Johnson had operational control over Canadian and American maritime air forces in the 
Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command from 1943-1945. [dnd photo PL-12772]
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good faith. They desired to get a head start on learning the rcAf’s 
methods so that they would “be ready to operate under the new 
scheme immediately the word go is given.”70 Finally, the usn installed 
a liaison staff from Argentia at Heakes’ headquarters in St. John’s 
in May, shortly after he had assumed local operational control of 
all Newfoundland maritime patrol aircraft.71 The coordination of 
Canadian and American maritime air power by cooperation had 
finally been abandoned and replaced with the centralization of their 
forces under Canadian operational control.
The creation of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command was 
a significant event in Canadian air force history. It was not just the 
initial occurrence of a Canadian air force officer having commander-
in-chief status in an active theatre of war;72 it was also the first time 
that American air forces came under Canadian operational control. 
By centralizing air forces under operational control, Canada and the 
United States also set an important precedent for their continental 
air defence command and control relationship in the early Cold War. 
It was indeed operational control that the rcAf and the United States 
Air Force implemented during this period, first to coordinate air 
forces defending the northeast approaches to Newfoundland during 
the early 1950s, and then centralized under the binational Canada-
us North American Air Defence Command (norAd) in 1957.73 The 
norAd operational control arrangement remains in effect to this day.
70  No. 1 Group to EAC HQ, 30 March 1943, DHH 181.002 (D124).
71  Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 549.
72  For many years it was the only time that a RCAF officer held a major operational 
command position in an active theatre of war—that is until Lieutenant-General 
Charlie Bouchard became the coalition commander of Operation Unified Protector 
(Libya) in 2011.
73  In Newfoundland during the early 1950s, the AOC RCAF Air Defence Command 
exercised operational control over USAF air defence forces. In the 1957 arrangement, 
the USAF NORAD Commander-in-Chief and his RCAF Deputy CinC exercised 
operational control over both nation’s air defence forces. Joseph T. Jockel, No 
Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American 
Air Defence, 1945-1958 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 
Chapter 5; Richard Goette, The Acid Test of Sovereignty: Canada, the United States 
and the Command of Continental Defence, 1940-1957 (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, forthcoming 2018), Chapters 7 and 8.
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conclusion
There were indeed significant national differences regarding the 
command and control of Canadian-American maritime air power 
in the Northwest Atlantic from 1941 to 1943. Canadian military 
culture dictated that Canadian and American maritime air forces 
should simply cooperate, while the Americans insisted that their 
relationship should be based on the us military practice of unity of 
command. A compromise was reached accepting cooperation with 
a provision that unity of command would be implemented in the 
event of an emergency. Still, the Americans remained unsatisfied 
with this arrangement, and they tried several times to push for unity 
of command, especially after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
brought the United States into the war as an official belligerent. 
Canadian air force leaders, however, successfully resisted the usn 
and usAAf’s numerous efforts to place rcAf maritime patrol forces 
under American unity of command.
The rcAf leadership continuously stressed to their American allies 
that the operational situation did not require greater centralization 
of command and control. Canada’s air force leaders also feared that 
the convoluted organization of maritime air power in the United 
States and the usAAf’s subsequent inefficient doctrinal approach to 
anti-submarine warfare would have a negative effect on any rcAf 
forces placed under an American commander. The declining number 
of us forces in the Northwest Atlantic also gave credence to the 
rcAf’s argument that maritime air power in the region should not 
be centralized under American unity of command. It was for these 
cultural, organizational, operational, and doctrinal reasons that the 
rcAf was able to successfully insist that coordination of Canadian-
American maritime air power continue to be accomplished through 
cooperation.
Cooperation proved to be an effective means to coordinate 
maritime air power when there was minimal enemy action. However, 
when the Germans intensified their U-boat offensive against Allied 
shipping throughout 1942, Canadian and American air forces’ 
combined efforts to defend convoys in the Northwest Atlantic proved 
insufficient. When maritime air power was engaged in continuous 
operations against the enemy, more centralized command and control 
was needed to ensure effectiveness. After consultations with rAf 
Coastal Command experts and negotiations that culminated in the 
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Atlantic Convoy Conference in early 1943, Canadian and American 
leaders finally agreed to centralize all maritime air forces under 
Canadian operational control with the establishment of the Canadian 
Northwest Atlantic Command in April. Adopting the proven British 
operational control system solved the problem of how to properly 
coordinate Canadian-American maritime air forces. It meant more 
centralized and effective command and control of Canadian-American 
maritime air power and greater operational efficiency to coordinate 
maritime patrol operations. Such developments were important 
factors in the protection of shipping and eventual Allied victory over 
the U-boats in mid-1943.
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